CIVIL PROCEDURE II
I. THE EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENT
A. STARE DECISIS: Use of precedent as basis for future decisions.
a. Reliance: Gives people a guide to conform primary behavior
b. Allows law to develop slowly and steadily.
c. Allocates judicial resources to most unique, newest, most interesting cases.
d. Conserves judicial resources - doesn't force judges to waste time.
e. Horizontal equity - all parties treated equally.
f. Notion of continuity in the law.
2. Why is flexibility of SD necessary?
To maintain coherence with other principles of justice, changing legal principles, moral and societal values, technology.
3. Example of use of SD:
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (955): SD stronger in statutory construction cases than in constitutional law b/c if Congress doesn't like construction, it can change it. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, (Supp.86) (S.Ct. didn't overrule Roe, but modified it somewhat w/undue burden language).
4. Problems w/SD
b. Maintains status quo
5. Exceptions to doctrine
a. Rule has become impractical, unworkable.
b. Related rules have so far developed as to leave old rule behind.
c. Facts have changed or come to be seen differently.
6. Res Judicata
Any doctrine that prevents someone from making a claim or a defense that has not been asserted before. Also prevents an issue from being relitigated.
B. CLAIM PRECLUSION
Encourages litigation of all claims, defenses, counterclaims all at ONCE.
1. General rule
a. Same parties cannot reassert against one another claims they have already litigated or could have litigated after a valid, final judgment has been entered.
b. Extends to compulsory counterclaims.
c. Usually in rem proceedings do not give rise to claim/issue preclusion. No CP b/c it may be expensive for ∏ to go after ∆ at home and we want ∏ to be able to win a little $$$ to finance the rest of litigation.
a. Promotes judicial efficiency/resources/authority of ct.
b. Provides repose.
c. Protects ∆ from harassment.
3. Three general requirements
a. Same claim
b. Same parties
c. Valid, final judgment
4. Same claim requirement
a. RULE - Rest. 24 (963). Claims defined by "same transaction" test.
i. Claim that relates to all or any part of transaction or series of connected transactions out of which original action arose.
ii. Same claim requirement applied narrowly b/c you can find common elements among many claims that should not necessarily be tried together.
iii. Narrowness requirement inefficient. May lead to conflicting decisions and also a hassle for ∆.
b. Relevant factors for same transaction test (similar to CNOF test)
i. Relation in time, space, origin, motivation?
ii. Would claims form a convenient trial unit? Check evidence needed.
iii. Would trying claims together conform to parties' expectations or business understandings?
c. Example: Clancey v. McBride (959)
i. ∏ & ∆ in car accident.
ii. Suit A: ∏ v. ∆ - property damage
Suit B: ∏ v. ∆ - personal injury
iii. ∆ says ∏ should be CP b/c claims should have been brought together
iv. Today, under Rest. test, ∏ would be precluded.
v. Then, ct. used "number of grievances" test, so ∏ allowed to proceed w/suit B.
d. Installment K's
i. ∏ must sue at same time for all payments due at time action is filed.
ii. Payments which become due later can be sued in subsequent actions.
iii. When there is an acceleration clause (default on payment and entire balance becomes due), cts. are split as to whether or not ∏ has to sue for whole balance at once.
5. Same parties requirement
a. General rule: One party can assert or be target of CP if it was a party to the original action or in privity to party in original action.
b. Rationale: Preserve ∏s autonomy.
c. Privity: Legal relationship where party to original action had full, fair opportunity to litigate that is sufficient to protect interests of 3rd party not present in that original action. Look for conflicting interests - if ∆ knows about conflicting interests, s/he must speak up. Otherwise, no rt. to oppose. Thus, ∆ has interest in seeing ∏ fairly represented. Hansberry v. Lee (970) (no privity b/c not fairly represented.)
a) Legal representative.
See Nevada v. U. S. (964). Native Americans in privity in U. S. during Orr Ditch litigation, which litigated its interest. Fact that U. S. did lousy job irrelevant to finding of CP. Unfair to make ∆'s fight twice. Remedy for Paiutes? Malpractice suit ags't U. S.
b) Contractual relations
c) Successors in interest to property
d) Trustee/beneficiary or indemnitor/indemnitee relationship
e) "Laboring Oar"
See Montana v. U. S. (971). U. S. forced co. to bring suit ags't Mt. - U. S. financed/directed suit though not a party. When U. S. itself tried to assert same claim ags't Mt., ct. held U.S. precluded.
f) "Bright sign" for mass tort ∆s.
i) See Provident Tradesmen v. Patterson (971) - seems to say that all parties who knew about 1st suit and didn't intervene may be later precluded from suing. "Deliberate bypass of opportunity."
ii) However, in Martin v. Wilks (971), ct. found deliberate bypass but didn't preclude litigation. TA's - seems to be better law.
ii. Exceptions to privity
a) Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc. (964)
Suits by ins'd and ins. co. arising from same transaction not precluded - no privity b/c ins. co.'s claim only for ltd. am't whereas ins'ds liability unlimited (if ins'd is the ∆). (Two situations - ins'd/ins. co. can both have claims or both be ∆s.) Reason? Protect ∏'s autonomy. Ins. co.'s set-up of suit may not match ins'd interests. Also, ins'd has little leverage to get ins. co. to do things her way.
b) Adversity requirement.
In order to assert CP, parties must have been adverse to one another in original action. Cannot assert CP against co-party in original action b/c we want to allow co-parties to raise common front ags't adversaries. Same reason we don't req. them to assert transactionally related claims ags't each other (Rule 13(g)).
But, see ct.'s rej. of "no adversariness" argument in Nevada v. U. S.. Ct. says water rts. are zero-sum game so all parties to original action are adversaries.
c) Mutuality requirement - non-parties to original action can't be bound by CP. You can only use CP in relation to those who could use it ags't you if case was different. Erosion of this principle in Nevada (Paiutes were precluded from asserting claims ags't water users who were not a party to the first suit.)
E.g. Martin v. Wilks - white firefighters not bound by settlement even though they knew of suit and could have intervened. ∏s should have joined
them. Incumbent on ∏s (and ∆s )to join all parties logically affected by suit's outcome to achieve full res judicata effect. (Unlike some class actions - non-party ∏'s precluded from asserting claims - ∆'s interest in repose.)
6. Valid, final judgment requirement
a. Full trial on the merits not necessary to create valid, final judgment. Look at hassle to ∆. If hassled only a little, ∏ may not be precluded. Balance w/ct.'s concern about full dockets. Only necessary that P had opportunity to litigate.
i. Rule 41(b): involuntary dismissals that do not give rise to CP.
a) Lack of SMJ (∆ files 12(b) motion) - no CP, may sue again on same exact claim. However, Q of SMJ may be issue precluded (so you go to other ct.)
b) Improper venue - no CP.
c) Failure to join an indispensable party.
d) Rule 41 voluntary dismissal - must request soon or otherwise may not be granted. If dismissed before ∆ writes answer, then it's w/o prejudice.
Note: a voluntary dismissal doesn't preclude bringing suit again (41(d)), but 2 strikes and you're out (41(a)(1)). Under 41(d), ct. can impose costs the 2nd time around.
e) Dismissal for lack of IPJ probably not CP b/c it's sometimes hard to tell at the beginning of the suit if there's IPJ. Also, if no IPJ, suit is dismissed early enough so there's little hassle to the ∆. ii. Other ways to achieve valid, final judgment aside from full trial on the merits. KEY - was there an opportunity to be heard? Rule 41(b) says all dismissals other than the above operate as judgment on the merits unless the ct. specifies otherwise, including:
a) Summary judgment
b) Demurrers and 12(b)(6) motions are tricky. E.g. Keidatz v. Albany (974) - used to not give rise to preclusion b/c little hassle to D. Now, w/liberal leave to amend pleadings, it seems fair to allow preclusion in these cases. Trend in this direction, away from Keidatz. So, dismissal on pleadings leads to valid, final judgment IF P could have amended and didn't.
c) Consent decrees/settlements (e.g. Agent Orange, Nevada)
d) SOL dismissal (b/c SOL has run, it has preclusive effect if parties should have known SOL has run. See Shoup v. Bell & Howell (977). (Note: If SOL expires in one state, can't bring in another b/c of FFCC. Encourages ∏s to do it right the 1st time, though also allows states to undermine each others' policies.
e) Default by ∏ or ∆ gives rise to CP unless no IPJ over ∏.
f) Appealable but unappealed judgments give rise to CP.
g) Failure to prosecute - ct. can call for involuntary dismissal w/prejudice - operates as an adjudication on merits and claim precludes (w/a few exceptions). (41(d)).
b. New technology/changes in law/uncovering of new evidence doesn't affect CP primarily b/c of need for repose/finality. See Nevada, Garland. Cts. don't preclude claims for new injuries that hadn't come to light at time of 1st suit.
c. Can ∏ be precluded by judgment in a ct. that didn't have juris. to hear the whole case? (i.e. Small Claims Court)
i. Trad'l position - no preclusion over claims which aren't w/in jurisdiction of the original ct.
ii. However, a ct. primarily concerned w/efficiency will reject the trad'l rule. Depends on state. ∏ should be precluded b/c ∏ should have brought both claims in a ct. that could hear all claims. However, this may deprive ∏ of full, fair opportunity to litigate in ct. of ltd. juris..
iii. Cts. do seem to be primarily concerned w/efficiency, but see Marrese v. Amer. Academy of Ortho. Surgeons (1027, fn.3). Judgment by ct. of ltd. juris. does bar rest of claim only if P could have brought entire COA in ct. in same system of cts. (state or fed.).
iv. Gen'lly, once judgment is made, it stands, even if there was no SMJ, b/c ∆ had opp'ty to be heard and didn't object. However, we have an interest in ct. w/proper expertise hearing the case, so for gross abuses, ∆ can attack judgment - otherwise, ∆ precluded. (Rest.12)
a) subj. matter of action so beyond ct.'s jurisdiction that entertaining action was an abuse of authority
b) allowing judgment to stand would infringe on authority of another ct. or agency
c) ct. lacked capability to make an adequately informed determination of a Q concerning its own jurisdiction.
C. ISSUE PRECLUSION
Anticipates that further claims will be adjudicated, but precludes certain issues from being relitigated.
1. Rule: Rest. 27 - When an issue of fact or law has been actually litigated and determined by valid, final judgment and that determination was necessary to the judgment, the judgment is binding in a subsequent action on same or different claim. Not every specific fact decided in case is precluded. See Evergreens v. Nunan requirement (984) - use IP only when parties had incentive to litigate issue to the fullest.
a. Designed to promote efficiency - if every single fact would later be precluded, parties have incentive to slug it out on every issue, which is really inefficient. (IRS cases - gain, not purchase price was what they cared about, so it was what they litigated fully.)
b. To determine if a particular fact is precluded, look at two things:
i. Motivation parties had to assure accuracy of facts.
ii. Foreseeability that fact would be imp't later. This is imp't, but not sufficient.
2. Requirements for IP
a. Same issue
b. Actually litigated
c, Issue necessary to judgment
d. Same parties
e. Valid, final judgment
3. Same issue
Issues will be considered not "actually litigated" (see below) if burden or standard or proof shifts from one case to next. Two things to keep in mind:
a. Who bears the burden of proof? (982 #4)
A v. B A has BOP to show freedom from contr. negl.
B v. A A no longer has BOP as D, so no longer held to judgment (A).
b. Standard of proof. If SOP different than in prior suit, issue may be precluded.
i. A: Crim. P v. D
B: Civil No preclusion.
SOP higher in (A) - beyond reasonable doubt.
ii. A: Civil P v. D
B: Crim. P precluded.
Lower SOP for (A); impossible for P to succeed in (B).
iii. A: Crim. P v. D
B: Civil D precluded.
iv. A: Civil P v. D
B: Crim. D not precluded.
4. Actually litigated
a. Issue must have been arg'd and decided.
b. Look at whether ct. in original adjudication made clear what they were actually litigating about.
E.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac (978) - 1st suit - unclear whether ct. determined whole bond was invalidly obtained, or just particular coupons that were sued upon. 2nd suit - no IP as to whether other coupons from the bond were invalid. (Cty. could have prevented 2nd suit by letting record reflect that entire bond was brought, if this was the case.)
5. Necessary to the judgment
i. But for resolution of the issue, the verdict would not have been rendered.
ii. If there are 2 or more possible logically independent bases for decision, each of which would fully support the judgment, neither issue is precluded b/c you can't tell which one was necessary to the judgment.
i. Russell v. Place (983)
Patentee v. infringer - infringer defends on 2 grounds: 1) patent is invalid; 2) no infringement. Neither issue precluded in 2nd suit b/c you can't tell which is necessary to the judgment.
ii. As dockets get fuller, cts. becoming more lax about this requirement. See Cardinal Chemical v. Morton - also patentee/infr. case. Remanded to lower ct. to have both issues decided. This seems to cast doubt on Russell. (Movement away from Russell today - in interest of effic., cts. moving to preclude both issues in patent cases.)
iii. Cambria v. Jeffery (982)
A: J v. C Both negl.; J contr. negl - doesn't recover.
B: C v. J C not precluded from denying contr. negl. b/c the issue of C's negl. wasn't necessary to the judgment in (A). However, issue of J's negl. not to be relitigated - already decided and dispositive in (A).
Gen' l rule: the person who could appeal is the one who should be estopped from relitigating.
c. Use of special verdict, which requires juries to be specific as to ground for their decisions, may give rise to IP b/c it enables cts. to tell which issues were necessarily decided. Beware of lazy juries and compromise verdicts.
6. Same parties
a. Old rule: Mutuality requirement
i. Party could preclude only those who could preclude her, therefore, a party not bound by an earlier action could not use the results of that action to bind her adversary who had been a party to that earlier action.
ii. E.g., Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co. (986). Only exception to old rule was when a non-party that sought to use preclusion was in an agency-type relationship w/the party to the earlier action. (E.g. employer/employee).
Prevent party from paying 2x.
b) Sometimes subjected parties to inconsistent obligations and multiple liability.
b. New rule: Erosion of mutuality doctrine
i. Defensive non-mutual issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) (DNIP): ∆ not a party in suit #1 can preclude ∏ in suit #2 who was party to or in privity to party in suit #1. Rule primarily concerned w/efficiency.
a) Bernhard v. Bank of America (987)
A: Trustee v. beneficiaries
B: Beneficiaries v. BOA
BOA used IP ags't beneficiaries b/c they already had full, fair opportunity to litigate and had motivation to litigate vigorously.
Upheld in Blonder-Tongue Labs v. U. of Ill. (992):
A: Patentee v. infringer - patent found invalid.
B: Patentee v. infringer #2 - patentee precluded from relitigating issue of patent validity.
b) Problems w/DNIP
i) Concretizes bad decisions/perpetuates bad results.
ii) Compromise verdicts
iii) Multiple liability/inconsistent results. Disturbs matchups. Ex.: patentee sues different infringers, wins 1st 3 cases, loses 4th. Next cases can try to use decision in (4) to preclude relitigation. Judge shouldn't allow DNIP b/c of inconsistent results.
iv) Party in 1st suit may not have had incentive to litigate vigorously.
c) Advantage: Forces ∏to sue all ∆'s at once and reduces litigation.
d) One limit to DNIP: If cases in multidistrict litigation for pretrial purposes, then sent back to districts for trial and one ∏ loses, the other ∏s not precluded from pursuing claims. In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton (1001): ct. found not enough privity to preclude other ∏s.
ii. Offensive non-mutual issue preclusion (ONIP).
a) Federal rule: Generally, ∏ in suit #2 who is not a party in suit #1 can assert IP ags't ∆ who was a party to or in privity to party in suit #1. B/c of numerous potential problems in allowing this, it's at discretion of ct. and allowed on case by case basis. E.g., Parklane v. Shore (996).
Note: NY rule - DeWitt v. Hall (992). Doctrine of mutuality a dead letter. ∏ can use preclusion as a sword.
b) Problems w/ONIP
i) Wait and see problem (affecting ∏s)
Parklane - Ps waited to see if SEC won - if so, they could use ONIP. If not, they're not precluded. This is bad - increases litigation; no repose for ∆.
ii) Procedural advantage available to ∆ in 2nd action unavailable in 1st.
iii) Forces ∆ to mount best defense in every suit, even if he doesn't feel inclined to.
* Note: Person you are precluding may have been the ∏ in the 1st suit. Example: 1) X v. Y; 2) Z v. X.
c) ONIP is discretionary. Factors to consider:
i) Could ∏ in 2nd suit have intervened in 1st? If so, no preclusion b/c it encourages ∏s to take wait and see attitude, which is inefficient.
ii) Did party precluded have an incentive to litigate vigorously in the 1st suit?
iii) Were future suits foreseeable at the time of the original litigation? (goes to incentive question)
iv) Were there procedural safeguards available in 2nd action that were unavailable in the 1st that may have led to a different result? (i.e. discovery, forum, pleadings, etc.)
Beeson case - trial by jury not a factor.
v) Could there have been a compromise verdict?
vi) Were there inconsistent verdicts in previous cases?
vii) Was the 1st suit for a small am't of $$$ and the 2nd for a much bigger am't?
d) Other limit: If case is based on an enterprise liability theory, the fact that a ∆ had previous opportunity to litigate the issue is insufficient to bar all other ∆s from relitigating, even the ∆s in privity for liability purposes. Hardy v. Johns-Manville (1002 #2)
7. Valid, final judgment requirement
Unlike CP you almost always need a final judgment on the merits to satisfy IP requirement (fulfill "necessary to judgment" and "actually litigated" requirements).
a. Dismissal for lack of SMJ only precludes issue of SMJ
b. Dismissal for improper venue only precludes issue of venue
c. Dismissal for lack of IPJ - no issue preclusion.
d. Exception: In in rem actions, judgment doesn't give rise to IP. Reason? If IP, then effect makes 1st suit not limited to value of res. If 1st suit not brought under IPJ, then no IP or CP.
e. SOL dismissal - no IP b/c issues aren't decided (however, you could be claim precluded)
f. Default judgment - no IP b/c nothing actually litigated or necessary to judgment (however, again, you could be claim precluded)
g. Judgment by administrative agency may constitute valid, final judgment for IP purposes. Tennessee v. Elliott (1002 #4)
But see Astoria Fed. S & L v. Solomino (supp.92). Preclusive effect of adjudication by administrative agency depends on context. When statute contemplates fed'l action, after agency consideration, no issue preclusion. Shows a higher fed' l interest.
*h. Settlements - CP, but no IP. (b/c not actually litigated)
D. BRAKES ON RES JUDICATA
1. Limiting doctrines on IP/CP
a. Change in the legal environment: if after 1st suit, there's a change in legal principles, an issue may be adjudicated again, though normally precluded. Can't hide behind earlier decisions.
i. Use this when imposition of IP would give one party a significant (dis)advantage over the competitors in her field.
ii. Cts. must balance interests of finality & repose w/significant legal changes.
iii. This doesn't apply to CP, b/c of interests of repose.
i. Commissioner v. Sunnen (1004). 1st suit - IRS sued Sunnen for liability on a particular K (year one); IRS lost. 2nd suit - IRS sued Sunnen on identical Ks for different tax yrs. (No CP b/c each yr. a diff. claim & transaction.) rule change (assignment of revenues no longer effective) means issue can be revisited. Ct. said no IP b/c it would create horizontal inequity. Allowing Sunnen to preclude IRS unfair - means different citizens pay different taxes.
ii. U. S. v. Moser (1008). 1st suit - Moser, a Civil War vet, entitled to benefits. After suit, change in legal benefits, so Moser not considered CW vet or entitled to benefits. Moser's high reliance interest is the basis for issue precluding the U.S..
iii. U. S. v. Stone & Downer (1008 #1). Ct. denied preclusive effect to former judgment giving importer a duty-free classification on certain goods. Law changed, don't want to give them a competitive advantage.
2. Government litigation - NMIP doesn't apply to U. S. gov't
a. Mendoza (1008) rule - cts. don't allow non-mutual issue preclusion (NMIP) to be asserted ags't gov't. 1st suit - 68 Filipino vets suing to get citizenship. 2nd suit - Mendoza sued U. S. for citizenship; wanted to preclude U. S. from relitigating issues decided in 1st suit. Ct. - M. can't use NMIP ags't gov't even though it creates horizontal inequity.
b. Reasons why you can't assert NMIP ags't gov't.
i. Fed. gov't litigation affects all, unlike litigation betw. 2 parties.
ii. In many areas, fed. gov't only one who can bring suit or is only ∆. Allowing NMIP would freeze development of law in those areas.
iii. Law develops by allowing various circuits to have different rules. Interpolation theory - S.Ct. looks at diff. rules to see how they work out.
iv. Don't want gov't to have to appeal every adverse ruling, b/c of ltd. resources; but don't want choices made due to ltd. resource to bind gov't forever.
v. Different administrations have different views/policies.
vi. U. S. gov't engages in more litigation than any other entity.
Note: unique role of Solicitor Gen'l (called the 10th justice). Where U. S. not a party, ct. asks SG to get inv'd and help ct. decide which cases should be adjudicated now.
c. However, mutual IP can be asserted ags't gov't. U. S. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. (1012). 1st suit - issue was could non-gov't employees inspect Stauffer's plants? No. 2nd suit - gov't went to different circuit to litigate; Stauffer allowed to preclude IP U. S. Don't want gov't to be able to keep going after someone in different forums. If, however, in 2nd case, U. S. had gone after diff. company and won, Stauffer would have to abide w/that rule in that circuit to maintain horiz. equity. If case in different circuits goes to SC, and U. S. winds, all circ. rules are knocked out and Stauffer would lose repose.
d. U. S. however is not exempt from being claim precluded (see Nevada.)
i. In IRS cases, IRS will announce acquiescence (abiding by circ. decision in entire U. S.) w/decision, or non- acquiescence (abide by decision only in that circuit).
ii. Social Security Administration doesn't even acquiesce in that circuit - only as far as particular litigant in concerned. Doesn't have to worry about litigation costs b/c most claimants can't afford to made SSA follow rule.
3. Procedural safeguards
a. Gen'ly, if procedural safeguards are available in 2nd case that weren't available in the 1st, you don't want to preclude party from relitigating. However, this isn't always the case.
b. Allen v. McCurry (1016). 1st suit - criminal case in state ct. ∆ tried to exclude evidence on basis of 12 & 14 Amendment - ct. says no. 2nd case - Allen brings 1983 civil rts. claim. - illegal seizure violated his rts. Arg'd no preclusion b/c 1983 action intended to be a federal remedy after a state ct. failed to defend his civil rts. Also, different proc. safeguards. S.Ct. said too bad - state ct. rules bound Allen. 1738 says fed. cts. have to give state ct. judgments same preclusive effect the state ct. would have given them. Had Congress intended to make an exception for 1983 actions, it would have expressly done so, so 1738 not a brake on res judicata (either CP or IP)..
c. Haring v. Prosise (1020, n.2) is smarter. Similar to Allen - in 1st suit, ∆ just pled guilty to criminal charge. By doing so, preserved claim for later suit.
d. Fed'l cts. do at times reexamine what state cts. do. E.g., Rodney King case, Crown Hts. Why? Different statutes and high fed'l interest.
E. INTERSYSTEM PRECLUSION
1. Policies behind it.
a. Limits forum shopping
b. Preserves sovereignty of state. cts.
c. Increases predictability
2. Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 USC §1738
a. Fed'l ct. preclusion of state ct. decisions (1. state; 2. fed'l)
Requires fed'l cts. to look to state preclusion law to determine preclusive effect and give judgment same preclusive effect state would (FFC to judgments of state cts.). Just b/c the 2nd issue is exclusively under fed'l jurisdiction doesn't mean there is no preclusive effect.
i. Similar to Erie and long arm statutes, S.Ct. leaves this one to the states, giving them some control over fed'l docket.
ii. Ex. - Fed. cts. must use state ct.'s laws to determine res judicata effect of its decision. CP in fed. cts. generally will not apply where ∏ unable to rely on a certain theory of a case or seek a certain remedy b/c of limitations on SMJ of ct. If state law doesn't allow preclusion in such a case, then state ct.'s decision won't have claim preclusive effect on COA that is w/in exclusive jurisdiction of fed. cts. Many states don't like fed'l intervention in their internal affairs and may create strong preclusive rules.
iii. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (1024). 1st suit: Violation of association claim dismissed in state ct. 2nd suit. Fed. ct., fed. antitrust suit based on same transaction. Fed. antitrust claim in exclusive juris. of fed. cts., but Marrese could have brought state antitrust claim under suppl. jurisdiction. Case sent back to see state's RJ rule (see if 2nd suit would've been precluded by state). Maybe Ill. law takes a hard line to make sure ∏ chooses the right ct. to hear all claims.
Problem: since states can't hear this claim, they probably won't have rules on it (b/c exclusive. fed. claim)
iv. Can't make a judgment more preclusive than a state ct. would have.
b. State ct. preclusion of fed. ct. decisions (1. fed'l; 2. state)
§1738 doesn't specifically address what preclusive effect state cts. must give fed. judgments; however, Supremacy Clause probably requires state cts. to give fed. judgment same preclusive effect that fed. ct. would give decision.
c. Rest. 2nd allows "splitting" of state/fed. claims (England (1030)).
a) Bring fed. action on fed. claim & stay it.
b) Resolve state claim in state ct.
c) Return to fed. ct., where no preclusion.
ii. Obviously wasteful - requires 2 suits.
3. Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV, Sect. 1
a. State to state preclusion
Cts. of each state must give judgments of sister states same preclusive effect as would the state which originally rendered it. Repose interest of state X is honored, but it trumps Y's autonomy interest and encourages X's forum shopping. Big advantage, though - predictability of effect of judgment.
b. Problem - child custody cases, which do NOT have final judgments. Leads to parental kidnapping so that parents can relitigate in another forum. Example: Thompson v. Thompson (1021). §1738(a) is example of problem of fed'l interest that gets fed'l solution.