Ana səhifə

Ethics of Development in a Global Environment March 6, 2004

Yüklə 80.31 Kb.
ölçüsü80.31 Kb.


Ethics of Development in a Global Environment

March 6, 2004

American Foreign Aid and Trade: A Silent War on Humanity

Pat Bomhack

Prepared for: Dr. Bruce Lusignan

At this moment, people are dying from lack of food, shelter, and medical care. The suffering and death that are occurring now are not inevitable, nor unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the word. The decisions and actions of individuals and institutions can prevent this kind of suffering. Given that one believes it is worthwhile to prevent this human suffering, it is also worthwhile to assess how different individuals and institutions play a role toward this end.

This paper will focus on the actions of one institution: the United States government. As the most powerful and wealthy nation, the United States is in a position to help those who live without basic needs -- perhaps more so than any single government or non-governmental organization. This paper will attempt to assess the role America has taken in aiding those who lack basic needs, focusing on American foreign aid policy. What is the history of American foreign aid? How does American aid compare with that of other nations? Which nations receive American aid and to what ends does it serve? Is there a disparity between the rhetoric and the reality of aid? An exploration of these questions may suggest methods for American aid to better reduce the human suffering and death caused from abject poverty. In total, America aid continues to be more of a political than a humanitarian tool. To poor nations, the effects of this policy can be as deadly and destructive as war.
From Marshall to Reagan: A Historical Sweep of American Aid

In the still wake of the Second World War, amidst the devastated cities and villages of Europe, the life of many ordinary Europeans was wrought with immediate crises -- hunger, homelessness, unemployment, sickness, and political restlessness. It is here that the story of American foreign assistance begins. To rehabilitate the economies of 17 western and southern European nations, the U.S. initiated a program formally termed the European Recovery Program. It sought to create stable conditions in which democratic institutions could survive. The United States feared that the poverty and dislocation of the postwar period were reinforcing the appeal of communism to western Europeans. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the first and foremost proponent of the European self-help program, described the impulse behind it as follows, “Our policy should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can existi.” Marshall worked tirelessly to explain to the American public why loans of economic aid were necessary and the program became popularly known as the Marshall Plan. In the next four years, the U.S. distributed some $13 billion worth of economic aid, helping to restore industrial production and establish financial security in Europe.

The Marshall Plan was a success. It is generally considered to have achieved its twin goals of jump-starting European economies and preventing the spread of Soviet power into Western Europe. Its program of economic aid was so successful that President Harry S. Truman extended it to less developed countries throughout the world under the Point Four Program, initiated in 1949. Although it was still unclear what form aid to underdeveloped nations would take, emphasis quickly was placed on technical assistance, largely in the fields of agriculture, public health, and education.

During the 1950s it became apparent in both the United States and the Soviet Union that direct conflict between the two powers was unlikely and that there would be a struggle for the allegiance of developing countries. As such, the communist-bloc countries and the West competed for favors in developing nations. American aid increasingly served the larger American foreign policy objective of defeating communism and it began to take the form of military grants to friendly regimes. Whereas military assistance had previously accounted for less than a sixth of American aid, between 1953 and 1961 it consumed over halfii. Unlike the philosophy of the Marshall plan, which emphasized economic health, it was now assumed that strengthening the defensive capacity of American allies was the surest way to deter the outside influence of Communism. In these relatively open societies, there was also fear of internal subversion by armed and generally anti-democratic domestic groups. As a result, American military assistance included police training, political advice, covert activities, and unrestricted financial bequests to try to pay off subversive groupsiii. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, this security assistance had widespread public support, while development aid was not nearly so well regarded.

Yet in 1961, President John F. Kennedy re-prioritized the goals of American assistance, relocating long-range economic and social development assistance efforts back to the top of the aid agenda. Kennedy argued that economic development did not simply complement a strong American security posture, but provided the basis for it. As he put it: “I urge those who want to do something for the United States, for this cause, to channel their energies behind the new foreign-aid program to help prevent the social injustice and economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feedsiv.” To install this new program, Kennedy guided the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 through Congress. The act reorganized scattered U.S. assistance programs into one bureaucratic agency and separated the disbursement of military from non-military aid. Notably, the act mandated the creation of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

In the end, Kennedy’s vision of foreign assistance did not remove America and American needs from the center of aid policy. Aid continued to be distributed as more of a political than a humanitarian tool -- as it had been (and as it would be), aid continued to be more concerned with fighting communism than fighting hunger, disease, or other traumatic effects of poverty. Still, Kennedy’s conviction that social and economic development in poor countries was vital to American security brought the practice of aid closer in line with its humanitarian ideals.

The legacy of Kennedy more or less continued to dominate aid policy until Ronald Reagan -- in the nearly two decades following Kennedy little changed. Congress made a few attempts to increase the efficacy of the USAID, but by and large aid remained on the back-burner of the federal agenda. Yet as the Cold War intensified in the 1980s, particularly in Latin America, aid began to carry extra importance in American foreign policy.

The Reagan administration’s determination to fight communist threats in the Central and South America brought with it a great increase in military and nonmilitary assistance. Along with military aid and training, the United States also pressed for and financed basic poverty alleviation policies. These reforms were seen as necessary complements to military aid to mollify the populations of these allied nations and keep America’s friendly strongmen from being overthrown by disgruntled massesv. As such, the emphasis was hardly on eliminating poverty. Rather, it is arguable that these policies had a negative long-term impact on the poor by keeping less than democratic rulers in power.

Lessons from the Past, Insight into the Present

As the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union clearly demonstrated, seldom (if ever) are the motives of donor nations straightforward or entirely altruistic. Rather, the extension of foreign aid is typically designed to provide some advantage -- whether political, military, economic, or other -- to the donor. If history often repeats itself, it may not be a surprise that American aid during the 1990s (and since) has arguably served American interests more than the interests of those suffering from the distress of abject poverty.
Trade Not Aid and its Discontents

During the 1990s, the dominant economic theory regarding emerging markets was neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is an intellectual and political movement beginning in the 1960s that blends traditional liberal concerns for social justice with an emphasis on economic growth. Neo-liberalism1 states that economic freedom is the means and the end that will lead to sustained growth. According to this mantra, increased trade is the best medicine the United States can give an ailing third world economy. Economic growth through open markets -- not traditional aid programs -- will solve the problem of poverty.

Adopting this philosophy, politicians and economists during the 1990s were heard saying that poor people needed ‘trade not aid.’ As a result, faith in aid declined and with it aid fell to its lowest level since the late 1950svi. This new approach to poverty alleviation triggered two major critiques: 1) That American aid declined without increases in trade that would benefit poor nations 2) That free trade alone was not a panacea for ending poverty.

Less Aid, More Trade: A Lie?

In a speech he delivered to the Overseas Development Council in 1997, Brian Atwood, head of USAID, argued that America’s ‘trade not aid’ policy was disingenuous. According to Atwood, “despite many well-publicized trade missions, we saw virtually no increase of trade with the poorest nationsvii.” Atwood became so disillusioned with the new approach to aid that he ultimately displayed his disagreement with the policy by resigning. His concern brings alarm to the following question: did and does America use the catch-phrase ‘trade not aid’ as an excuse to reduce its aid commitments without increasing its trade?

In many ways, America -- like Europe and Japan -- has failed to open its markets in industries that could most benefit the poor. For example, agriculture, along with textiles and clothing, is among the industries most likely to help developing countries’ economies grow. Yet America spends nearly $200 Billion annually on agricultural subsidies, while Europe and Japan pitch in a collective $150 Billion to protect their farmsviii. These subsidies devastate foreign economies that depend on agricultural exports for growth. Mark Malloch Brown, the head of the United Nations Development Program, estimates that these farm subsidies cost poor countries about $50 billion a year in lost agricultural exportsix. Latin America is the worst affected region, losing more than $20 billion annually from these policies. Yet the effect is felt in most developing regions, such as Africa. In a speech delivered in June 2002, James Wolfensohn, the World Bank president claimed that “these subsidies are crippling Africa’s chance to export its way out of povertyx”; New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof, adds that they are “holding down the prosperity of very poor people in Africa and elsewhere for very narrow, selfish interestsxi.” These are, as Kristof describes them, subsidies that kill.

American trade policies concerning textile and clothing industries tell the same story: despite the obvious importance of these sectors in terms of development opportunities, America and other Western nations have consistently and systematically repressed developing country production to protect their own domestic producers. The Center for Science and the Environment released a study in April 2002 which assessed the current trade arrangements as follows:

Thus the status quo in world relations is maintained. Rich countries like the U.S. continue to have a financial lever to pry open markets of developing countries for multinational corporations. Developing countries have no such handle for Northern markets, even in sectors like agriculture, clothing, and textiles, where they continue to have an advantage but continue to face trade barriers and subsidies.xii
According to the same study, the estimated annual cost of Northern trade barriers to Southern economies is over $100 billion. Interestingly, this is much more than the total of rich countries’ aid to poor countries ($57 billion)xiii allowing some to claim that rich countries take back with their left hand every cent given with their right. These barriers can make talk of ‘trade not aid’ appear hollow and leave the policy vulnerable to being tagged as disingenuous.

They also highlight a potential double standard in American trade policy: how can America pressure other countries to reduce government interference while continuing to subsidize some of its own industries? To receive aid, recipient countries often have to adopt structural adjustment packages designed by the IMF and World Bank. Making a grant or loan conditional on some action being taken by the recipient is called “conditionality.” Conditionality works by “trenching” economic assistance packages -- that is, dividing the total sum to be donated or loaned to a recipient country into a series of smaller disbursements to be made over time, called trenches. Before each disbursement is made, the recipient must make policy changes spelled out in the aid agreement that they must sign with the USAID. For example, according to Franci Lappe and Joseph Collins, co-authors of World Hunger: 12 Myths, between 1982 and 1990 nine U.S. economic assistance packages provided to the Costa Rican government made disbursement conditional on more than twenty structural changes in the domestic economy. These included eliminating a grain marketing board that assisted small farmers; slashing support prices for locally grown corn, beans, and rice; allowing more imports from the United States; easing regulations on foreign investment and capital flows; and complying with specific clauses in similar agreements signed with the World Bank and the IMF.xiv

In sum, levels of decreased aid have not been accompanied with increased trade in the sectors that most affect developing nations, making it easy to label the policy as disingenuous. Further, when American demands for structural adjustment in other countries are contrasted with American domestic subsidies, the policy is seen as hypocritical.

Trade Not Aid, Not a Panacea

These criticisms have been supplemented with the argument that ‘trade not aid’ is a flawed doctrine. That is, free trade alone is not a cure-all for poverty. According to this line of reason, increased aid is vital for the world’s poorest countries if they are to grasp the opportunities provided through trade. Trade and aid are necessary. In a 1998 study entitled “The Context of International Development Cooperation,” economist Humberto Campodonico asserts that “growth is a necessary but insufficient condition for poverty reductionxv.” Likewise, in a report from Oxfam in 2002, the organization stated that “the proposition that economic growth alone will solve long-term needs and emergency programs will fill the gaps in the short-term has been widely acknowledged as false.xvi” What has been the social success of neo-liberal reforms?

During the 1990s, structural adjustment programs were applied in almost all emerging markets. As in the previous example of Costa Rica, it meant the State’s withdrawal from all business activity and the process of privatizing public companies. As a result, private capital flows into developing nations rose spectacularly, from $43.9 billion in 1990 to almost $300 billion in 1997xvii. Short and long-term capital inflows increased 700%, creating an environment of high optimism about the potential for growth and business opportunities in these marketsxviii.

However, the benefits of economic growth did not lead to much improvement in the unequal distribution of income in developing countries. For example, social inequality was seen to increase in Africa and remained unchanged in eastern Asia and Latin America, the region with the most unequal distribution of income in the world. In southern Asia, however, there was improvement in unequal distribution of income.xix

Economic growth, then, did not yield the expected social results. While some argue that overall poverty was reduced, there was almost no improvement in the unequal distribution of income. This history has proven that it is necessary to explore alternatives for development that challenge the neo-liberal paradigm based strictly on the free play of market forces. As Campodonico emphasizes, there are limits to the liberalization of markets. He suggests that one of the guiding principles could be that there should be as much market as possible and as much State as necessary. Regrettably, it has taken the advocates of ‘trade not aid’ programs a woefully long time to acknowledge that their doctrine is incomplete.

The legacy of the 1990s offers several suggestions for ways American aid and trade policy can better reduce the human suffering caused from abject poverty. These will be more specifically outlined later. Prior to designing this laundry list, however, it will be useful to assess how American aid fits into the larger picture of world aid, and to better understand how much aid America gives, to which countries it gives, and to what ends these disbursements serve.

The Reality and Rhetoric of World Aid

In March 1995, the nations of the world met at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen to discuss the state of humankind. The Social Summit was the largest gathering ever of world leaders at that time. Heads of State and Government donned the convention halls. At the end of the Summit, these leaders pledged themselves to the Declaration and Program of Action. According to the Declaration, the leaders had gathered “to commit themselves, their Governments and their nations to enhancing social development throughout the world so that all men and women, especially those living in poverty, could lead satisfying livesxx.” They agreed that to support and promote these efforts needed to be “the overriding goals of the international community, especially with respect to people suffering from povertyxxi.” In pursuit of these goals, the rich nations committed themselves to give 0.7% of their Gross National Product in aid and to focus 20% of this aid on basic social services in the least developed countries. Yet a glance at world aid will show that rich nations have failed to meet their commitments on both accounts: as a whole, they have neither given 0.7% of their GNP in aid nor have they focused 20% of aid on basic social services. These failures reveal the disparity between the reality and the rhetoric of aid.

In exact, twenty-two countries, including the United States, promised to give 0.7% of GNP in aid. These twenty-two countries comprise the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a club of industrialized countries with the capacity to give aid to poorer ones. Their aid, known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), does not included private contributions or private capital flows. Therefore, ODA is a measure on the priorities that governments themselves place on these issues. By 2000, aid from the rich nations had sunk to 0.23% of GNP, the lowest level since 1965. Below, Figure 1-A traces this history since 1970.

Table 1-B below gives the total amount of aid given and aid as a percentage of GNP by country in 2002. Graphs 1-B and 1-C display this data in graph form.

Note that in terms of volume, the United States is the most generous nation, contributing nearly $13 billion. It is interesting to note that since 1992 Japan had been the largest donor of aid in terms of volume. In 2001, the United States reclaimed that position. Commenting on the change in trend in 2001, the OECD noted that most of the United States increase in 2001 was due to a $600 million disbursement to Pakistan for economic support in the September 11 aftermath. In the same year, Japan’s aid dropped nearly $4 billion, largely due to a significant depreciation of the Yen.
Note that only five countries -- Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Sweden met the target of 0.7%. The United States ranks last, contributing 0.12% of GNP.

Table 1-Bxxii


ODA Total (millions)

Percent of GNP










































United Kingdom
























New Zealand




















United States



Graphs 1-B and 1-Cxxiii

Below, pie charts 1 and 2xxiv detail which countries receive aid and to what ends it serves. Note in Pie Chart 2 that not all aid demarcated as “Health” refers to basic health services, nor does “Water supply and Sanitation” refer necessarily to providing low-cost water. As such, the aid in these categories do not necessarily reflect commitments to basic social services. In total, DAC nations reported that less than 3% of aid in 2000 focused on basic social services. This is far below the 20% pledged in 1995.

As these figures and charts show, the world’s richest and most powerful nations have reneged on their promises made at the Summit. With the exception of a few nations, they have all failed to meet their promise of 0.7%. None have dedicated themselves to providing basic social services at the promised levels. The evidence suggests that the United States in the least likely to honor it formal aid commitments, at least in terms of promised GNP. Is the disparity between the rhetoric and reality of aid even greater in the United States than other countries?

America: Worst of the Worst?

As President Jimmy Carter articulated in 1999, “We are the stingiest nation of allxxv.” It may be fair to label America the stingiest on three accounts: how much is given, to whom it is given, and to what ends it serves.

How much is given

Let it be stated that the generosity of the American people is far more impressive than their government. Americans privately gave at least $34 Billion overseas in 2004.xxvi In light of the demonstrated generosity of many Americans, many would probably be chagrined to learn that U.S. foreign aid is only 0.15 percent ($13 billion) of America’s gross national product.

Interestingly, several studies conducted over the past few year have shown that the American public believes that foreign assistance amounts to over 15% of the federal budgetxxvii. Few Americans realize that the United States has the lowest level of effort among rich nations. This level is curiously low because studies have shown that a majority of Americans believe an appropriate level of aid is close to 13%, a far cry from 0.15%. Even given these studies, there may be a simple reason for the disparity between public opinion and governmental action: aid has a negligible effect on voter decision making.

Where it is given

U.S. economic assistance is highly concentrated on a few governments. Its focus has nothing to do with poverty. Out of the 130- odd governments receiving U.S. bilateral economic assistance in the mid 1990s, just 15 countries got over half the total. Israel and Egypt -- representing U.S. geopolitical interests -- together got almost one-third. At the World Economic Forum in New York, February 2002, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy condemned this American policy, exclaiming that “two-thirds of US government aid goes to only two countries: Israel and Egypt!”xxviii

The world’s ten poorest countries -- most of them in Africa -- received less than 5 percent of all U.S. bilateral economic assistance in fiscal year 1994. Despite widespread poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, only two of the top ten recipients, South Africa and Ethiopia, are in that regions, and the former is its most economically developed nation. Below are listed the top 15 recipients of American aid in 1999.

Top 15 Recipients of U.S. Economic Assistance in 1999 ($ millions)xxix

  1. Israel 1,200

  2. Egypt 815

  3. Russia 263

  4. Ukraine 161.4

  5. India 156.3

  6. South Africa 131.9

  7. Peru 123.9

  8. Bolivia 121

  9. Haiti 116

  10. Ethiopia 108

  11. Turkey 105.8

  12. Bosnia 80.6

  13. Bangladesh 77.8

  14. West Bank/Gaza 76

  15. Phillippines 74.9

To what ends

As this paper has stressed, America is the main beneficiary of its aid. Foreign assistance programs have benefited the United States by creating major markets for exports. It is not uncommon for countries to give bilateral aid on the condition it is used only to purchase goods and services from the donor country -- nearly 27% of world aid is given in this Yet the US has the worst record for spending its aid budget on itself -- 70 percent of its aid is given on the condition that it be spent on US goods and services. That is, where the U.S. did give aid, it was most often tied to self-stroking economic objectives. In 1995, the director of the USAID defended his agency by testifying to his congress that 84 cents of every dollar of aid goes back into the U.S. economy in goods and services purchasedxxxi. In the same year, for every dollar the United States put into the World Bank, an estimated $2 actually went into the U.S. economy in goods and service. These policies continue.

Assessment and Recommendations

The reality of aid on the threshold of a new millennium is that it continues to be used as more of a political than a humanitarian tool. An understanding of this fact provides several recommendations for aid to better reduce human suffering. Below is a suggested listed of the four greatest problems with American aid and potential recommendations. In short, the problems are first, American subsides, and next, what could be referred to as the Big Three: how much aid is given, where it is given, and to what ends it serves. All of the recommendations below are based on the idea that the United States government should adopt a policy which gives greater consideration to the needs of non-American humans than is currently practiced.
Problem #1: American subsidies cripple poorer countries ability to export their way out of poverty.

Recommendation: Re-evaluate the cost-benefits of American subsidies. It may likely be shown that these protectionist measures are harmful to the U.S. as well as to third world producers. But even if not, a greater priority given to the effects of these subsidies on foreign economies than will demand a reduction in American subsidies in agriculture, textiles, and clothing.

Problem #2: America has failed to meet its 0.7% commitment

Recommendation: Increase American aid to meet 0.7% GNP.

Problem #3: Aid is concentrated on a few countries, and disproportionately on lower middle-income and middle-income countries.

Recommendation: Distribute Aid with a better emphasis on need, rather than geo-political importance.

Problem #4: Aid is not used to provide basic social services, which has been proven as one of the most effective ways to reduce poverty.

Recommendation: Re-prioritize to what ends aid serves, focusing 20% on providing basic health, water, sanitation, and food.

Everyone’s Business

The fact that more than a billion people are living and dying in poverty is not a tragic twist of fate. The goal of absolute poverty elimination remains affordable and within reach. Yet the reality of aid on the threshold of a new millennium is that it is not helping to eradicate poverty because it has little to do with ending poverty. Aid can only play a minor role in reducing poverty. It is vital to look at some of the other major elements beyond aid that will determine whether poverty will be overcome. These include unfair trade policies and devastating debts that make it impossible for poor nations to pull themselves out of economic distress and disorder.

This reality is an indictment of the global political, economic, and social order. It illustrates the failure of political leadership on a grand scale. Surely it is morally unacceptable for the rich world to enjoy the benefits of globalization -- increased affluence for many in the North -- while refusing to take seriously the idea of globalized rights to have human needs met? Or, is the result of globalization that the most disadvantaged developing countries will be left in 2015 with millions of children dying prematurely, denied basic education and health, clean water and adequate nutrition -- while the world’s wealthy enjoy even higher standards of living?

What is needed is political momentum that makes overcoming poverty not the purview of a middle-ranking government department, but one of the key priorities guiding overall government policy. A global human security agenda whose first priority is ensuring that people are able to enjoy economic, social, and political stability is surely one around which an effective public and political consensus can be built. This global agenda will come to bear only if the decisions and actions of human beings will it into existence.


1  Two notes on the use of neo-liberalism. First: the current definition of neo-liberal is contested. The arguable failure of neo-liberal policies to alleviate poverty where they were applied has led many previous neo-liberals to seek a more flexible definition of neo-liberalism, one which admits the need for trade and aid. These critics of the neo-liberalism of the 1990s could be termed the New Neo-liberals. Secondly: many confuse the terms neo-liberal and neo-conservative. Neo-conservatism is an intellectual and political movement in favor of political, economic, and social conservatism that arose in opposition to the perceived liberalism of the 1960s. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. the neo-conservatism of the 1980s is a replay of the New Conservatism of the 1950s, which was itself a replay of the New Era philosophy of the 1920s. In continuation of this history, Neo-conservatism is the intellectual motivation of the current Bush administration. In many ways, the economic philosophy of current neo-conservatives regarding emerging markets is little different from those of neo-liberals during the 1990s, creating a confusion in terms. Both emphasize the need for free trade and the liberalization of markets. These two philosophies differ significantly, however, in regards to domestic economic philosophies, and other political and social philosophies. Lastly, neo-conservatives do not question the ability of free markets alone to solve issues of poverty, unlike the New Neo-liberals.

i Marshall, George C. Commencement Address at Harvard University, June 5, 1947. Available online at: February 20, 2004.

ii Eberstadt, Nicolas. Foreign Aid and American Purpose. AEI Press: Washington D.C. 1989, p. 43.

iii Ibid, p. 53.


 Ibid, p. 57.

v Frances Moore Lappe, Collins, Joseph. World Hunger: 12 Myths. Grove Press: New York, NY. 1998, p. 130.

vi Lancaster, Carol. “United States.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000, p.80.

vii Shah, Anup. “The United States and Foreign Aid Assistance.” Available online at February 15, 2004.

viii Kritof, Nicholas. “Farm Subsidies that Kill.” New York Times. July 5, 2002.

ix Ibid.

x Ibid.

xi Ibid.

xii Puppets on purse strings, Down To Earth, (Centre for Science and Environment) Vol 10, No 23, April 30, 2002. Found online at February 15, 2004.

xiii German Tony, Randel, Judith. “World Aid at a Glance.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000, p.4.

xiv Frances Moore Lappe, Collins, Joseph. World Hunger: 12 Myths. Grove Press: New York, NY. 1998, p.133.

xv Campodonico, Humberto. “The Context of International Development Cooperation.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000, p. 10.

xvi Meeting the Challenge of Poverty ReductionOxfam, March 2, 2002. Available online at February 15, 2004.

xvii Campodonico, Humberto. “The Context of International Development Cooperation.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000, p. 11.

xviii Ibid.

xix Ibid.

xx Declaration from the Social Summit in Copenhagen. 1995. Online at: February 15, 2004.

xxi Ibid.

xxii Shah, Anup. “The United States and Foreign Aid Assistance.” Available online at February 15, 2004.

xxiii Ibid.

xxiv Figures drawn from German Tony, Randel, Judith. “World Aid at a Glance.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000, p. 5.

xxv  Carter, Jimmy. Quoted in Who rules next?Christian Science Monitor, December 29, 1999. Online at: February 15, 2004.

xxvi Shah, Anup. “The United States and Foreign Aid Assistance.” Available online at February 15, 2004.

xxvii German Tony, Randel, Judith. “Political and Public Opinion.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000, p. 275.

xxviii Shah, Anup. “The United States and Foreign Aid Assistance.” Available online at February 15, 2004.

xxix Frances Moore Lappe, Collins, Joseph. World Hunger: 12 Myths. Grove Press: New York, NY. 1998, p. 135.

xxx German Tony, Randel, Judith. “World Aid at a Glance.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000, p. 5.

xxxi Aristide, Jean-Bertrand. Eyes of the Heart; Seeking a Path for the Poor in the Age of Globalization, Common Courage Press: 2000, p. 13.

Works Consulted

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand. Eyes of the Heart; Seeking a Path for the Poor in the Age of Globalization, Common Courage Press: 2000.
Campodonico, Humberto. “The Context of International Development Cooperation.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000.
Carter, Jimmy. Quoted in Who rules next?Christian Science Monitor, December 29, 1999. Online at: February 15, 2004.
Declaration from the Social Summit in Copenhagen. 1995. Online at: February 15, 2004.
Eberstadt, Nicolas. Foreign Aid and American Purpose. AEI Press: Washington D.C. 1989.
Frances Moore Lappe, Collins, Joseph. World Hunger: 12 Myths. Grove Press: New York, NY. 1998.
German Tony, Randel, Judith. “World Aid at a Glance.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000.
Kritof, Nicholas. “Farm Subsidies that Kill.” New York Times. July 5, 2002.
Lancaster, Carol. “United States.” The Reality of Aid: 2000. Earthscan Publications: London. 2000.
Marshall, George C. Commencement Address at Harvard University, June 5, 1947. Available online at: February 20, 2004.
Shah, Anup. “The United States and Foreign Aid Assistance.” Available online at February 15, 2004.

Verilənlər bazası müəlliflik hüququ ilə müdafiə olunur © 2016
rəhbərliyinə müraciət